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F7TVBURA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 15 CR 73 (RMB) V. 5 EVGENY BURYAKOV, 6 Defendant. ARGUMENT/DECISION -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. July 29, 2015 9 11:10 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. RICHARD M. BERMAN, 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 PREET BHARARA, United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 ADAM J. FEE IAN P. McGINLEY ANNA M. SKOTKO 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 19 WHITE & CASE 20 Attorneys for Defendant SCOTT E. HERSHMAN 21 OWEN PELL KELLY NEWMAN 22 23 ALSO PRESENT: ANDREW TARUTZ, Russian Interpreter 24 25

THE COURT: First we should note that we have a
Russian language translator present.

I hope you're translating. Are you? Everything,
until we get to the point where it may not be necessary.

So let me ask Mr. Buryakov if he is able to
understand, first of all, through the Russian interpreter,
that's Question No. 1.

THE DEFENDANT: (In English) Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, second, do you want to use the interpreter or shall we have him here in a standby capacity? It's your call.

THE DEFENDANT: (In English) In a standby.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

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So we set this date aside for oral argument.

Before we hear from the parties, I want to underscore that whatever we say here today, myself or the lawyers, etc., in no way interferes with or denigrates the presumption of innocence that applies in a criminal case such as this.

So sometimes in these motions we sort of sound like we are talking to the merits, but that presumption of innocence is sacrosanct and it applies unless and until a jury determines the outcome of the case, whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. I wanted to make that clear.

I want to frame the issue for a moment just by saying that we have a motion from the defense dated June 11, 2015,

followed up by a reply also from the defense dated July 17, 2015, in which the defense has moved to dismiss the indictment in this case and, in the alternative, the defense moves for what is called a bill of particulars. That motion is opposed by the government, which filed its response on or about July 6, 2015.

And then one other point by way of background. The law or the statute that we will be talking about and construing here this morning is a statute called 18 United States Code, Section 951 and several of its subsections, in particular, a subsection (a) and subsection (d), "D," as in David. There may be references to other aspects of that statute, as well.

Just so that it's clear as background, that statute says, in part, the following:

Whoever, other than a diplomat or consular officer or attaché, acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the attorney general, if required in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.

And then the subsection (d), which both sides have been discussing in their papers, states as follows:

For purposes of this section, the term "agent of a foreign government" means an individual who agrees to operate within the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official, except that such term does

not include — then there are some exceptions. The one that we are principally concerned about says: Does not include any officially and publicly—acknowledged and sponsored official or representative of a foreign government.

So with that, I'm happy to hear from defense counsel,
I'm happy to hear from the government. I have read your
papers, and I'm pretty far along in an analysis. I do have
some questions of each side, as well, not very many, but one or
two.

So Mr. Hershman.

MR. HERSHMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Is it all right if I stand here?

THE COURT: Whatever you're more comfortable with. You can use the podium, if you'd like; otherwise, that will work fine.

MR. HERSHMAN: I'll use the podium.

Thanks, your Honor.

We read your Honor's order with respect to the time limitation of the argument, and we'll adhere accordingly, so I appreciate that. That was helpful.

THE COURT: If you want, I'll tell you the question or questions I'm going to ask of you; it may be folded into your presentation.

So one question relates to a comment or an argument that you have made where you say that there are potentially

thousands of individuals in the United States like
Mr. Buryakov, persons openly working in representative
capacities for foreign government agencies and
instrumentalities, but in nonconsular, nondiplomatic posts. So
I am going to ask you what that means in your opinion and what
the implications of that are.

And the other question that I'm going to ask you is part of your motion deals or alleges that the government's allegations are insufficient in the indictment in particular. So the question I'm going to ask you is if the government had alleged in the indictment that the statutory exceptions to registration did not apply to Mr. Buryakov, would this moot the first part of your motion to dismiss.

And similarly, when the government goes to present,

I'm going to ask them if they have any plans to make such an
amendment or supersede or however they go about doing that, if
they have an intention to do that.

MR. HERSHMAN: That's very helpful, your Honor. Thank you. And I'll address both questions.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HERSHMAN: Let me just begin by suggesting something that we all agree on, I believe, to frame the issue. We agree that if the defendant had given notice that he was working for the Russian government, he did not need to register under this statute, under 951.

So the only question is whether saying that he was working for VEB is saying that he's working for the Russian government for purposes of 951.

VEB is a specialized development bank created by

Russian law and owned and controlled by the Russian government.

The U.S. Government itself has said that VEB is part of the

Russian government. And we pointed your Honor to the places

where the government has said so, but it includes and is not

limited to the U.S. Department of Treasury press release upon

sanctioning VEB as part of the sectoral sanctions that have

been implemented under Executive Order 13662 against VEB, in

which the U.S. Government states that VEB is a Russian

state-owned financial institution that acts as a development

bank and payment agent for the Russian government. It was

formed in 2007 pursuant to Russian federal law, and is the

legal successor to Vnesheconombank of the U.S.S.R.

THE COURT: Could you spell that perhaps for the reporter just so the record will be clear.

MR. HERSHMAN: Sure. My apologies.

THE COURT: That's all right.

MR. HERSHMAN: Which was a specialized Russian state bank. VEB's supervisory board is chaired by the Russian prime minister, and the chairman of the bank is appointed by the Russian president. VEB acts as an agent for the Russian government for the purposes of, and then the press release

continues to go on and state these quintessential government functions, which include, but are not limited to, servicing/repaying the sovereign debts of the former U.S.S.R. and Russia, and collecting debts from legal entities of Russia municipal governments, providing and executing state guarantees of Russia and so forth. These are quintessential government functions. And, your Honor, we've cited case law in this circuit that confirms that those are quintessential government functions.

So the U.S. Government itself has stated that VEB is part of the Russian government. But we really want to direct your attention, your Honor, to the regulations that expressly define what is a foreign government for purposes of this statute. These are regulations created by the government, and these are regulations that directly address the question at issue.

In 28 CFR, Section 73.1, which is cited repeatedly in our papers, the government has included a definition of "foreign government" for purposes of Section 951. This is not a definition that they rely on in their papers. They run away from this definition, although it is expressly relevant and directly relevant to the question at issue.

THE COURT: You cite it in your papers.

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes, we did.

The government refers to Section 11 of 18 U.S.C.,

which simply says that foreign government as used in that title includes, and then it goes on to say what is included. But this statute specifically addresses the definition of "foreign government" for purposes of 951, and it is broader, but inclusive, of what is in Section 11, specifically with respect to government factions or bodies of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at peace. That was the purpose of Section 11.

73.1 includes that and is broader. And there it states specifically that the term "foreign government" includes any person or group of persons exercising sovereign de facto or de jure political jurisdiction over any country other than the United States or over any part of such country. And importantly, it includes, quote, any subdivision or any such group or agency to which such sovereign de facto or de jure authority or functions are directly or indirectly delegated.

In this case, your Honor, the government argues that VEB does not fall within the definition of a foreign government capable of sponsoring Mr. Buryakov's visit to the United States under Section 951 by omitting that part of the regulation that expressly defines the term "foreign government."

This term, as expressly defined in 73.1, is quite broad, and it includes a person or group of persons exercising sovereign political jurisdiction over a country and any group or agency to which the sovereign authority or functions are

directly or indirectly delegated. As I mentioned, in the press release the government admits that this is a group of persons who exercise sovereign political jurisdiction over the Russian Federation. And, more important, it is an agency to which sovereign authority or functions have been directly and/or indirectly delegated.

The Russian prime minister, as mentioned and admitted by the government in their press release, is the head of the supervisory board. And the members of the supervisory board, your Honor, include first deputy chairmans of the Russian government, deputy chairmans of the Russian government, minister of economic development of the Russian Federation, deputy chairman of the Russian government, an aide to the president of the Russian government, the finance minister of the Russian Federation, and the chairman of the bank.

There is no question that those are --

THE COURT: Is your client on that board?

MR. HERSHMAN: No, he is not, your Honor. My client is a representative of that bank.

THE COURT: Okay. So I wouldn't mind if you get to one of the questions I posed.

So does that mean that everybody who works for VEB Bank in New York, janitor, secretary, I don't know how many people there are, does that mean they are all covered as Mr. Buryakov is?

MR. HERSHMAN: No, your Honor. It would cover people with supervisory responsibilities, which Mr. Buryakov clearly had at the bank.

THE COURT: Where does that delineation come from that they have to have supervisory responsibility?

MR. HERSHMAN: That is in the case law, and it's in the -- I think we cite it, in 73.1, a more expansive definition of what is a person who would fit the definition in that particular respect. It would not apply to janitors, it would not apply to temporary workers; it would apply only to supervisory persons, of which he clearly is.

THE COURT: Where exactly is that language?

MR. HERSHMAN: I'll show you the page, your Honor. Let me direct you to that page.

If your Honor turns to 73.1(e). I'm getting you the page in our brief that says this.

(Pause)

MR. HERSHMAN: Just one second, your Honor. I'll pull it. It is an important point.

(Pause)

MR. HERSHMAN: I will suggest, by the way, that there is no dispute by the government that Mr. Buryakov had supervisory responsibilities.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out who's in and who's out.

MR. HERSHMAN: Right. Got it.

(Pause)

MR. HERSHMAN: If you look on page 11 of our memorandum of law in support of the motion, this is Subsection (b), we refer to the argument your Honor is addressing now where 951(d)(2) follows a separate statutory exemption for a narrow class of foreign persons, and then proceeds to statutory exemption for a wider class of foreign persons, namely, any member of a staff of or employee of individuals described in (1) and (2). And the argument, therefore, is that 951(d)(2), which is this section that is relevant here, reaches a class of foreign officials and representatives who, like Mr. Buryakov, as VEB's deputy representative, do not on the one hand qualify as diplomates or consular officers under (d)(1), but who, on the other hand, occupy more senior roles than staffers under (d)(3).

THE COURT: Is that where you draw the conclusion that there are potentially thousands of individuals in the United States like Mr. Buryakov, those thousands of people all fit into this statutory scheme?

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes. But they are not limited to Russian Federation agencies. It would include every foreign country.

THE COURT: The thousands are from every country, not just, of course, from Russia?

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes.

Russia and many other countries have state-owned economic investment banks, so it would be France, Japan, Canada, China, even the United States does, EXIM Bank.

The point that we were making, your Honor, is that there has never been a prosecution of anyone in a position like Mr. Buryakov, because clearly Mr. Buryakov and anyone similar to him in a supervisory role at a foreign government as defined by the statute would not be required to register. This is, to our knowledge, the first time the government has alleged that there's a violation of 951 for someone who clearly is working as an official of a foreign government.

THE COURT: Let's assume for the moment -- and, again, this is just assumption because of what I said at the outset.

Let's assume that -- is this a loophole in which foreign governments could send thousands of people who are -- I'm just using the word for purposes of discussion -- spies to the United States, and they wouldn't have to register, is that --

MR. HERSHMAN: Well, it's an interesting point, your Honor, because that's exactly the point that the United States Congress made when the Department of Justice presented this exception to them as part of the amendment to 951. And, in fact, the U.S. Senate asked the Department of Justice, Hey, wait a second. Isn't this a way in which foreign countries, in particular communist bloc countries at the time —

THE COURT: Or anybody.

MR. HERSHMAN: -- or anybody would send covert operatives into the United States and why do you want to exclude them from the registration, to which the U.S. Government responded, We know, we get it, and, yes, we want to exclude them. So it was intentional.

THE COURT: Your response today, putting aside what they said in their legislative debate, what's your response to my question?

MR. HERSHMAN: I don't believe it's a loophole at all, your Honor. I believe it was intentional in a way to manage the registration and basically suggest that if you're here and we know that you're here working as a representative of the foreign government as we defined it in 951, you needn't register under this section; it is not a crime for you to not have registered. Clearly, Mr. Buryakov was working for a foreign government as defined by the government in Section 951, under 73.1, and he did not need to register.

It is not a loophole; it's the law. And we think that the law here, which the government ignores entirely in their papers, is clear and controlling.

THE COURT: It's not a loophole, but you're saying it's a vehicle for foreign governments to send in covert operatives legally into the United States. Is that the conclusion?

MR. HERSHMAN: I'm not suggesting something to foreign governments that they can now employ as a means of sending in foreign operatives. What I'm suggesting is that this exact issue was raised.

THE COURT: That's the implication though.

MR. HERSHMAN: And the implication was actually raised.

THE COURT: And that's how you're trying to include

Mr. Buryakov in that. I'm not saying he's guilty of any
infraction whatsoever; but, conceptually, is that a vehicle for
sending in covert operatives legally into the United States, in
your opinion?

MR. HERSHMAN: In my view, your Honor, it is a regulation that exempts from registering foreign officials who are working for a foreign government as defined by the statute who entered the United States legally.

Let me just refer your Honor to page 7 of our memorandum of law where we quote Senator Denton.

THE COURT: No, no, I'm familiar with that. But if you'd like, you can quote it now.

MR. HERSHMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Senator Denton asked the Department of Justice at the time of the amendment to this particular statute in 1984 that included this exception, and I'll quote: Some have suggested that diplomates, foreign government officials, and print and

broadcast media personnel be exempted from 1959, that's the predecessor to 951's coverage. However, aren't these the positions that are most usually used by communist bloc countries as cover for their intelligence agents.

THE COURT: Good question.

MR. HERSHMAN: It was a good question.

The issue was raised to the Department of Justice in 1984 at the time, and the Department of Justice supported the implementation of this exemption and answered the question that they understand it and said yes, and we support this particular amendment.

The issue was not to have foreign government make registration harder for U.S. people abroad.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, the issue was not what?

MR. HERSHMAN: To have foreign governments make registration more difficult for U.S. people abroad. And so there's reciprocity kind of working here. Everything that we do is mirror-imaged on the other side, and this was part of what was discussed at the hearing in 1984, when this particular exception was created, and it was created knowing that this was a potential, that there could be people coming under cover of working for another foreign —

THE COURT: Spies.

MR. HERSHMAN: -- for a foreign government, and they may not be who they say, as Senator Denton pointed out.

You don't believe, by the way, that's Mr. Buryakov.

THE COURT: No, no, of course. That was my original point.

But you happen to know, just as a matter of curiosity, whether Russia has a reciprocal provision that we could send people to Russia and spy for the United States under a similar -- you're not calling it a loophole, but under a similar provision?

MR. HERSHMAN: I don't, your Honor. But I seem to recall -- and, again, I want to check this, so I'm suggesting I need to check this, but I seem to recall that there was some congressional testimony regarding the reciprocity, if you will, use of this kind of mechanism. I will check that and report back to you. I don't want to be quoted as misrepresenting that.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

It might be an older time period that may not be current today.

MR. HERSHMAN: Correct. Exactly.

But at least at the time of the enactment of the exception, which the government was okay with because they knew that these people were all here. And that's the point, right, is that when Mr. Buryakov was sponsored to come to the United States by VEB, a part of the foreign government of the Russian Federation under the definition here, there was no hiding that

he was coming here to engage in as an agent of VEB. He's not shy of saying that, and he --

THE COURT: There was no hiding that he was here to be the deputy for the bank.

MR. HERSHMAN: Correct. That's exactly right.

THE COURT: He didn't say that he was coming to do anything unlawful on behalf of the Russian Federation.

MR. HERSHMAN: We would argue that he hasn't.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. HERSHMAN: In all events, your Honor, that's not what the statute requires, right. Once the government is on notice that you're here, that's all that's required, and you are not required to register.

So the plain language is clear in the statute. The legislative history is clear, your Honor. And there's no question that the defendant here is an agent of the Russian government through his role at VEB. He wasn't shy about it --

THE COURT: There's a question. There's no question in your mind.

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: They have challenged that.

MR. HERSHMAN: They have, but not by applying the actual statute. They've applied some completely different analysis which has no relevance to the issue before the Court.

He worked for a state-owned bank; he was officially

and publicly acknowledged and sponsored by a foreign government; his status was known, and his visit authorized by the Department of Homeland Security. There was no question about that. He falls squarely into the exception of (d)(2) in Section 951.

Your Honor asked a question about 951(d) and our argument about the government's failure to plead the exception in the indictment. And, yes, your Honor, with respect to that aspect of our motion, it is fatal to the indictment.

Where an exception is incorporated in the enacting clause of a statute, the burden is on the prosecution to plead and prove that the defendant is not within the exception. We cited a Supreme Court case for that direct proposition, the Vuitch case. I probably mispronounced it, but --

THE COURT: If you could spell that.

MR. HERSHMAN: V-U-I-T-C-H.

Actually, maybe I got it right, I don't know.

But 951(d) expressly creates an exception that is incorporated in the enacting clause of 951(a), through the definition of the term "agent of a foreign government." And it was therefore fatal for the government to not plead that exception.

THE COURT: Not to plead it.

MR. HERSHMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: But if they did, that argument, I suppose,

would be moot.

MR. HERSHMAN: We would not have made the argument if they did, your Honor. But I don't think that they can, because if they adhere to the definitions in the statute and regulations, it's impossible for them to plead that exception, because it applies to Mr. Buryakov, and it applies as a matter of law. This is not a factual issue; this is an issue of law. The definition is contained —

THE COURT: Of course they argue it in their papers.

MR. HERSHMAN: They do, but, again, they ignore the law. And our point is that if they follow the law, which is the definition of foreign government --

THE COURT: I get that. But they have made the point in their motion papers, although they haven't pled the exception, as it were, in the indictment. That's true, right?

MR. HERSHMAN: They make the argument that they don't need to plead the exception, and they cite a case for pleading affirmative defenses, which is entirely different than what is here. This is not an affirmative defense. This is part of the enacting clause.

THE COURT: They cited a 1922 case from the Supreme Court.

MR. HERSHMAN: The more recent case they cite, I think, was an affirmative defense case which they rely on. And that is not the issue here. This is an enacting clause of a

statute.

THE COURT: The 1922 case, though, is not an affirmative defense case; isn't that right?

MR. HERSHMAN: I don't believe so. But the more recent case they cite is. And our case is a 1971 case, which is directly on point, we believe.

So, your Honor, I want to be mindful of the time limitation that you set, and I appreciate it.

THE COURT: I asked a whole bunch of questions, so if you have a couple more points you want to make --

MR. HERSHMAN: That's okay, your Honor.

What I'd like to do is just briefly address the bill of particulars issue and then I'll sit down.

I think I've made my points on the 951. And again, I'm happy to answer any additional questions on that point.

With respect to the bill of particulars, your Honor, this is going to be a combined bill of particulars argument and just updating the Court on the status of the discovery issues because they are related.

Mr. Buryakov is in custody clearly. And even if he is convicted after trial, which we doubt, any sentence might well not be very long, depending on what the guidelines and the Court chooses to apply here. Without some more specification by the government of the relevant discovery, it will likely take a very, very long time for us to prepare this case for

trial because we will need to review everything.

And now I want to put this in context. The volume of data is humongous. There's 5,000 hours of video, over two and-a-half years. I would venture to say, your Honor -- and I'm not exaggerating -- that virtually all of it is irrelevant. There's 1500 hours of wiretaps. I'd venture to say that of those wiretaps, virtually all of them are irrelevant. There's 15 terabytes of data.

The data includes everything that was seized by the government from Mr. Buryakov's office and his home and his person at the time of his arrest and the execution of the search warrants. That includes — and I've seen these, so I can attest to it — video of his family's birthday parties, pictures of his family, shopping lists, etc., etc., etc. It's virtually all irrelevant.

We do not have a particular way, from what was turned over to us, of identifying specifically what the government intends to rely on and what they actually claim proves their case.

THE COURT: So I got that point from the papers.

Have you had the opportunity with Mr. Fee to meet and confer about these issues?

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you made any more progress than what's reflected in the papers?

MR. HERSHMAN: Not exactly, your Honor, and with credit to Mr. Fee and the government, okay, because our conversations have been productive and helpful.

Mr. Buryakov still does not have access to the video that we brought to your attention quite a long time ago. The government has delivered the video, as I understand it, to the MCC, but it hasn't worked. Mr. Buryakov simply does not have access to it and still doesn't.

THE COURT: You mean the technology there hasn't worked?

MR. HERSHMAN: That's right.

Second, I am unable to review any of this material directly with Mr. Buryakov because I can't bring it into the MCC in a form that is usable. So I can bring a CD into the MCC, but I can't take 5,000 hours of video and dummy it down to a CD. It would take a building full of CDs in order for that to happen. It's impossible. I have been discussing this with Mr. Fee. We've been discussing possible alternatives.

In fairness, your Honor, it's kind of the same issue and, at the same time, a separate issue. One is do I really need to review 5,000 hours of videotape.

THE COURT: Right. I get it.

MR. HERSHMAN: And the second is how am I going to review this material with Mr. Buryakov in a way that allows us adequately to prepare a defense in this case.

THE COURT: So it's that discussion I'm wondering if you -- are you still talking about that?

MR. HERSHMAN: We are. We are, but we may need the Court's intervention.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. HERSHMAN: There's one suggestion that we bring Mr. Buryakov to a proffer room at the courthouse. The problem with that is that a U.S. Marshal would need to be present in the room. That's not particularly acceptable to us. We can't have private, frank conversations with our client.

THE COURT: What's the technology problem at the MCC?

MR. HERSHMAN: The data is on five or six hard drives,

and we're not permitted to bring any mechanism into the prison

itself except for a CD.

THE COURT: Except for?

MR. HERSHMAN: CD. And the data is too dense to be transferred to a CD. It's even too dense to be transferred to a DVR; it's on hard drives, and it's huge.

The second problem is that the computers that are in the lawyer rooms at the MCC are antiquated and, we think, not up to current technology specs. So they are not able to read the information, even if it's there, hence the problem that Mr. Buryakov has in not being able to see the video.

THE COURT: No, I get it. It is somewhat ironic that they have the capability to make the videos and the recordings,

but not the capability to display them. But that's something else.

MR. HERSHMAN: There's a third problem, which includes the software that was used or is used by the government, I believe it's called NCASE, which is not publicly available and requires us to engage a vendor, which we are in the process of doing, to actually search and view the material. So all of this is complicated by the fact that we don't even know what we are looking for.

So that's my bill of particulars piece.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HERSHMAN: Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Fee.

MR. FEE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Could you just, since my curiosity is so aroused -- so this issue about pleading the exception, are you stymied in doing that or is that something you might do or could do?

MR. FEE: Your Honor, we could obviously quickly fix that. Our position is that there is no fix required. We cite Second Circuit and Supreme Court law that you don't need to specifically negate every exception to a statute. There are obviously other statutes.

THE COURT: I got the legal argument; I'm just

thinking about the practical one would moot a whole part of the defense, as Mr. Hershman has indicated.

MR. FEE: It would certainly moot it, your Honor.

I would also point out just for the Court's edification that in the indictment, there is a clause -- and it's in paragraph 6 with respect to Count One, it's also in Count Two -- where we allege that Mr. Buryakov worked as an agent of the SVR, we say: Without prior notification to the attorney general, as required by law.

Your Honor, we would submit that even to the extent that it was required to somehow plead that the exceptions did not apply, that, at least indirectly, doesn't. The allegation is he was required to register and did not.

THE COURT: No, no, not to belabor the point, but you certainly argue in your papers that he's not covered by the exception, right? So I'm just wondering if this is an easy cure -- not a cure, if it's something you contemplate doing.

Mr. Hershman says you can't do it, as a legal matter. But you do do it in your submissions, that is to say, make those arguments.

Is there anything stopping you from doing it in an indictment, in a superseding indictment, for example?

MR. FEE: No, your Honor, there's nothing stopping us from that. We could do so quickly.

As to the legal points or the arguments made by

Mr. Hershman, I'll just pick up on the question the Court asked, specifically the contention that the defendant makes that there are potentially thousands of individuals like the defendant in the United States. So that is true in one respect, but I think this point does highlight really the absurd reading, the strained reading that the defendant has urged upon this Court. It would eviscerate Section 951. There are —— I don't know if it's thousands —— many people employed by state—run corporations.

THE COURT: Not just the VEB Bank, right?

MR. FEE: Not just VEB Bank. Other state-owned

corporations that are owned by the Russian Federation, as well

as other countries, friend and foe.

THE COURT: There probably are thousands altogether.

MR. FEE: It certainly could be thousands, maybe even tens of thousands here in the United States.

Important point: VEB, as I imagine many of those other corporations, is a freestanding company under Russian law. It is not an arm or an agency of the Russian Federation. Your Honor, that was and, I believe, is the position of Mr. Buryakov. He urged that exact position upon this Court. In fact, those are his words: VEB is a freestanding company under Russian law; it is not an arm or agency of the Russian government, but has a separate and independent corporate existence that is well-recognized under U.S. law.

THE COURT: He did that back in May, not, it should be clear, in arguing this motion. At the time he was arguing about who was paying for his counsel. And it's in that context -- I'm just setting the --

MR. FEE: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: It is in that context that he or counsel made these comments which seemed to contradict -- I think it's fair to say they are at odds somewhat with the contentions that are made in the course of the motion to dismiss.

MR. FEE: That is the context, your Honor. And lawyers make arguments, but those are facts. And when Mr. Buryakov's counsel stated those facts, the U.S. Government did not dispute them because they are true.

I would urge the Court -- I know it is doing so -when you listen to Mr. Hershman's arguments, please look at the
actual text of the statutes, the regulations, and the things
attached to his own motion, to Mr. Buryakov's own motion,
including the enacting law under Russian law that created VEB.
We highlight this in the brief; I won't detail it here. I
would note the broad point that statute uses the Russian
Federation and VEB separately. It says, the Russian Federation
cannot interfere with VEB. The liabilities of the Russian
Federation are not the liabilities of VEB.

THE COURT: And vice-versa.

MR. FEE: And vice-versa.

Mr. Buryakov and the bank branch of New York confirmed this fact, that they are distinct. They confirmed it in their actions. Mr. Buryakov held himself out from the time he entered the United States, as the Court observed, as Mr. Hershman said, as an employee of the bank, as a banker. He stated it over and over on his visa applications for a work visa, an L-1 work visa, as they call it. He obtained a visa for an intracompany transfer, from one branch of the bank to another. The bank itself, the New York branch which applied for his visa, signed by the deputy representative of the bank in New York, stated over and over and over and over again this man's business was to be a banker engaged in international banking in New York for the bank.

Your Honor, it is a very important point. Your Honor asked it. At no point did Mr. Buryakov ever identify himself as an official representative of the Russian Federation, of the foreign government, the word used in Section 951. This is not complicated. Mr. Hershman has urged upon this Court some ad hoc, frankly, strained readings.

The Court asked Mr. Hershman to point out where he drew this distinction from, under his reading of the statute, that supervisors somehow were exempt, but janitors weren't. Your Honor, I think it was clear he could not point out where he drew that distinction from. He was making arguments based off of the structure of the statute, but there was no such

distinction drawn.

I think another thing that highlights --

THE COURT: You're saying there was no specific distinction between supervisors, whoever that might be, and anybody else.

MR. FEE: There's not even a whiff of a distinction because it's not there.

I think another point to highlight, legislative history, as they've called it, and I think this is even on the edges of whatever that may be, has become front and center in their argument.

I would urge the Court -- and I know it has -- to read exactly what Mr. Hershman pointed to. It's a statement by a government official talking about diplomatic privileges and immunities, help U.S. diplomates abroad, so we don't want to exclude those or make those people register in the U.S.

It is not about the exception at issue here, your Honor. It is not even close to being about the exception. 951 has an exception for diplomates; that is not what Mr. Buryakov is arguing applies to him. He's arguing something applies to him which frankly is not even close to applying.

I would just focus, to move away from the point, I will briefly touch on another portion of the phrase "officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored official or representative of a foreign government."

Addressed the foreign government point, your Honor, frankly, I don't think it's close to say he was here on behalf of that. Officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored, whatever that may mean, it does not apply to Mr. Buryakov.

There were essentially two core deceptions, as alleged in the indictment, which are presumed to be true at this stage, two core deceptions that explain how this defendant came to New York and engaged in work on behalf of the Russian spy organ.

First is that he was a banker, as he stated over and over in applying for an L-1 visa. I would just note, your Honor, that the L-1 visa, the forms attached to this defendant's motion, explains the purpose of an L-1 visa. It's in the papers. It says it's for foreign companies doing business in the U.S. We've outlined some other language in that visa and the applications themselves that make clear it did not confer any status.

He held himself out only as a banker for VEB. That's the first exception. The second is he stated repeatedly, under penalty of perjury, that he was not entering to try to engage in espionage. The government would submit those were both lies. That is not officially and publicly acknowledging oneself as an official of a foreign government, the Russian Federation. It is the opposite. It's a banker getting a work visa applied for on behalf of his bank to come here and be a banker and to not even do that, your Honor.

The final point I would make just on -- this again relates back to the point about who else would be covered, the loophole that could be created.

THE COURT: Before you do, you have some allegations, both, I think, in the indictment and certainly in the papers that suggest that Mr. Buryakov — and I don't know if they are called codefendants, they are the government officials who were apparently not in the country anymore. I don't know if "codefendant" is the right terminology.

But, in any event, they were, according to you, agents of the foreign government engaged in espionage or related activities. You allege or state that there are conversations among them to which the objective was to obscure the fact that Mr. Buryakov was undertaking actions that were not for his employer in particular, right?

MR. FEE: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: They were totally separate and distinct from any actions he might take as a banker.

Is that a fair statement?

MR. FEE: That is a completely fair statement. And those two men were charged in the same indictment; they are obviously not here. They, unlike Mr. Buryakov, had official cover; they were diplomates and consular officials for the Russian Federation.

To pivot off that point, your Honor, there are other

allegations in the complaint, of which the Court can certainly take notice of here, that make the same point.

The information Mr. Buryakov was obtaining as a spy was not being funneled to his superiors at the bank in New York; it was being funneled to a trade official, an attaché to the Russian ministry. Other spies with whom he had no other reason to be channeling this information. And we go into, frankly, great detail in the complaint.

One final point, your Honor.

The reading of the government would not result in this, essentially, rendering Section 951 a dead letter. People like Mr. Buryakov who are here on behalf of, to use his own words, his counsel's words, freestanding companies, would not be covered by what we've called a sponsored official exemption because they are not officials of a foreign government; they work for a corporation.

Your Honor, they would -- although it is not an issue before the Court -- be covered by a different exemption, the legal commercial transaction exemption, Section (d)(4). And it is significant that it's not even argued here that it could apply to the defendant, because it wasn't, there is nothing legal about what he was actually doing.

Your Honor, unless there's any other questions on the statute point, I'll move on to the bill of particulars.

We obviously argued the vagueness point in our papers.

THE COURT: My question to you is the same one as to Mr. Hershman on bill of particulars. Do you have any plans afoot to talk to him and solve some of these essentially discovery problems or difficulties that he's having?

MR. FEE: Absolutely, your Honor. There's sort of a process point, and then there's, I guess, a substance point.

The process point, Mr. Hershman raised with me yesterday, this issue he's having, that he cannot bring in anything other than disks, the government's interests are the same as his. We want him to have every opportunity to review the discovery himself and certainly with his client. We have reached out to legal counsel at the MCC. I am discussing with colleagues in my office some creative interpretations, creative solutions, including — I don't know if we can do this yet — finding a clean way to get in all the discovery, say, on a clean laptop that is routed through MCC Legal rather than carried in by counsel. We will work as quickly as we can and we'll report to the Court and, of course, keep talking to Mr. Hershman.

He characterized accurately the other process point, which is the technical issues we've been having at the MCC with getting the surveillance footage just to work. We are now converting it into another format, and we will update

Mr. Hershman and the Court and try to do that as quickly as possible.

As far as the substantive requests underlying the bill of particulars, Mr. Hershman couched his argument in really broad terms, your Honor. I would just point the Court to pages 22 and 23 of Mr. Buryakov's opening brief which outlines the specific requests that were made to the government and which he now makes as part of his motion.

Your Honor, first, frankly, the complaint and the discovery in this case are exceedingly detailed, especially the complaint. I know your Honor has read it. It does exactly what Mr. Hershman argued did not happen here; it outlines what the evidence is, dates and times of meetings, the substance of conversations, the identities of the people involved in the meetings. And to highlight the fact that, frankly, I think most of the information they are saying they don't have, they already have.

THE COURT: Well, there's two categories. One is can you help him simplify his search or his review of the materials that you have provided. He's saying there are hundreds or thousands of hours that are not relevant. One question he's asking is can you help him pinpoint where to find the relevant information. That's one.

Two is he may be asking you for additional -- he is, in fact -- information in some regards.

My point is that most often, cases that I've presided over, counsel, working together, meeting and conferring,

usually can eliminate many of these problems that seem still to exist in terms of the papers, the motion and opposition.

MR. FEE: Of course, your Honor, that is always the best solution; and, yes, we will continue to do that. If there are any additional requests, we will address them and try to help in the best way we can.

Our motion related to these six numbered requests, just to point out that each of these requests actually is phrased as the following: We want this information, excluding the meetings or items referred to in the complaint paragraphs, and then it names five or six paragraphs. Each request has an exclusion.

Frankly, your Honor, that is a lot of detail already in the defendant's possession. The government has attempted to address more specific concerns. I know the Court has seen this in the papers; we provided a letter. You hear a lot of references to all the surveillance footage. We are doing our best to narrow that. We know it's a lot. We've provided detail. When we find more meetings on that surveillance footage, we will give another list. So we want to make this review as easy as we can for the defense.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FEE: Unless there's anything further, your Honor --

THE COURT: The last question, not to beat a dead

horse, but is there any plan afoot to amend or supersede to plead, as he says is legally required, the exclusions or the exemptions?

MR. FEE: Your Honor, our position is it's not legally required. Quite frankly, it would be a fairly meaningful change in pleading practice not only in this district. It is not the normal course, to use the language of the courts, to negative every exception in a statute. Absent an order from the Court, doing so or, frankly, some compelling precedent cited for us, we don't have any plan. But of course your Honor is correct that we can quickly -- if this is the right phrase -- fix that in the event the Court deems it necessary.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FEE: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HERSHMAN: Briefly, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HERSHMAN: It seems, based on Mr. Fee's argument, that the Department of Justice is looking now to rewrite the regulation that controls the application of 951 and, again, ignores 73.1, which specifically defines foreign government as I discussed earlier.

What's interesting is the issue was actually raised prior to the enactment of the regulations in the statute by the Senate and discussed by the DOJ.

THE COURT: This is 1984?

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes.

There's another quote that I want to give which kind of puts what Mr. Fee is suggesting the Court do here, which is essentially rewrite 73.1 in the regulations in this case.

The government, the Department of Justice, stated in enacting the amendments to 951(d) and the exception at issue here: "Even extensive communist bloc use of diplomatic media or other covers for their intelligence operatives does not, in our opinion, destroy the utility or desirability of exempting such categories of personnel from the provisions of this statute."

That's the position of the Department of Justice. It can't be rewritten for this case in this courthouse.

Second, I referred earlier to a recollection --

THE COURT: That assumes that I --

MR. HERSHMAN: Yeah. And I apologize. But Mr. Fee would urge the Court to do that.

I mentioned, your Honor, that I had some recollection about a reciprocity statement made in connection with the enactment of the amendments to -- well, actually, it goes back earlier in the enactment of the bill, 1981. There is a quote from the Department of Justice in which -- and it follows the quote I just read about the question raised about using cover and wouldn't this be a loophole, as your Honor referred to it. The government responded.

1 One part of the response was as follows --2 THE COURT: This is response by whom? 3 MR. HERSHMAN: The Department of Justice. This is in connection with the 1984 amendments in response to Senator 4 5 Denton's questions. It's not quoted in our papers, but it's 6 part of the official record of the congressional hearing on 7 this amendment. The Department of Justice said: "Finally, under the 8 9 principle of reciprocity, new restrictions simply invite 10 retaliation; and the president favors expanding, not contracting, the contest of ideas with the Soviets." 11 12 So my recollection was to that point, your Honor. 13 that addresses the reciprocity aspect. 14 THE COURT: This from me is just dicta. MR. HERSHMAN: I wanted to just complete the record. 15 THE COURT: No, no, no, I mean what I'm about to 16 17 say. 18 MR. HERSHMAN: Oh. THE COURT: It's probably fair to say that people said 19 20 a lot of things in the '80s that might not be said today, just 21 generally speaking. I'm not saying that literally applies to 22 what you just said. 23 MR. HERSHMAN: I appreciate that, your Honor. 24 Department of Justice has had opportunity to change the statute

or seek to change the statute, and they haven't done, so other

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than through Mr. Fee.

I want to point out also in connection with the suggestion that there was no openly-acknowledged role here with respect to Mr. Buryakov and what VEB actually is in terms of its application, its statement to the United States, in connection with Mr. Buryakov's application through VEB to come to the United States back in 2010. VEB wrote a letter to the Department of Homeland Security in which it described the bank for development of foreign economic affairs, VEB, by saying that VEB of the U.S.S.R. was originally established in 1924 as the Soviet Union's bank for foreign trade. The bank's role is as an agent of the Russian government in international trade and economic development.

According to the Russian legislation, VEB is a specialized state bank of Russia and is entrusted with providing external debt servicing, as well as the centralized foreign economic operations for Russia. Worldwide, VEB currently employs 1200 people and achieved, and it goes on to describe.

This was in the sponsoring petition to the United States Government for approval to issue a visa for Mr. Buryakov to come to the United States as the deputy representative in the United States for VEB. This is officially and publicly acknowledged in plain words. The United States Government was clearly on notice of the role of VEB. It confirmed the role of

VEB most recently in imposing sectoral sanctions against it. In stating what it is to the United States Government, it is directly at odds with what Mr. Fee is arguing.

THE COURT: Now, he has also said that comments that the defense has made in this case back in May seem to be antithetical to the points you are making now. The defense seemed to be more willing and interested in drawing a distinction between the Russian Federation and VEB in saying that they were separate rather than one and the same, which is a thrust of the motion.

MR. HERSHMAN: As your Honor pointed out, in connection with the *Curcio* proceedings, for a totally different purpose, in responding to your Honor's question about payment of fees, we pointed out that VEB is a separate state-owned --

THE COURT: I'm not taking any responsibility for the answer. I may have raised the question in the context of Curcio, but I didn't give the answer. The answer does seem to be somewhat at odds with the argument that you --

MR. HERSHMAN: I apologize for any confusion for my answer, your Honor, but intended, as part of that answer, was to address your Honor's question concerning the payment of fees and the separateness of VEB. But what is important about that --

THE COURT: Wait. But so that's his point.

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes. And I'm going to address the

point.

THE COURT: That's his point, is that you -- in that context, in this case, you did say that VEB and the Russian Federation were entirely distinct.

MR. HERSHMAN: For purposes of the payment of fees, I pointed out that VEB is a separate state-owned corporation, and that's the point that I made.

What controls here and what is relevant is under the CFR and under 951, whether it's a separate state-owned entity or not is not part of the definition of foreign government and not controlling with respect to the application of 951.

THE COURT: I thought you said at that time that VEB is a freestanding company under Russian law; it is not an arm or agency of the Russian government, but has a separate and independent corporate existence that is well-recognized under U.S. law.

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: I think you said that on May 14th.

MR. HERSHMAN: Yes. And that is correct.

As it concerns your Honor's question at the time, which related to the payment of fees only, your Honor directed me to address that question in my letter, which is what we did. But you did not direct us to address what is VEB as it's defined under Section 73.1 or with respect to 951. The fact that it is a freestanding company under Russian law is

irrelevant to --

THE COURT: Is irrelevant or --

MR. HERSHMAN: Is not relevant to the determination the Court needs to make that pursuant to 73.1 and 951 as written in the statute and regulations, VEB is a foreign government.

THE COURT: I don't understand how it could be irrelevant. It's quite the opposite of what you're contending in the motion, it seems to me.

MR. HERSHMAN: No, no. My letter isn't the statute, your Honor. What I'm referring the Court to is two different issues. There was an issue concerning instrumentality and payment of fees that your Honor raised in the *Curcio* hearing. The statement that I made is true.

THE COURT: Candidly, I think there's more overlap than distinction. In both context, both in the *Curcio* context and now, you were all talking about the relationship between the VEB Bank and the Russian Federation. So that's the same issue here. It may have different legal consequences. One is who's paying the legal fees, and another is the applicability of 951.

But it's a factual question, and I don't think the facts change between May and today. I do think that there is -- "contradiction" may be too strong a term, but what was said is what was said.

As I said before, I'm not taking responsibility for the answers; I just ask the question in the context of the *Curcio* hearing. The answer then appears to be different than the answer you're putting forward today. Factual matters, not legal interpretations.

MR. HERSHMAN: With all due respect, your Honor, I think perhaps if there was a poor choice of words in respect to the *Curcio* hearing, which didn't contemplate the current issue or address the current issue, then for that I apologize.

THE COURT: That I think is so. It wasn't on anybody's radar --

MR. HERSHMAN: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- perhaps at the time, but --

MR. HERSHMAN: Exactly.

THE COURT: I'm not responsible for radar.

MR. HERSHMAN: Exactly.

But your Honor asked a specific question, which we answered accurately. Sovereign authority is what is relevant here. In terms of making a determination as to whether VEB is a foreign government is encompassed in the definition of foreign government under the relevant statute, that is what is at issue, sovereign authority, and clearly VEB has that.

For purposes of this analysis, what the government is urging is that you ignore the regulations in the statute. You can't simply ignore the regulations in the statute, and they

can't get around -- and Mr. Fee did not suggest any way around -- the fitting of VEB clearly into the definition of foreign government in the regulation. It's interesting that he continues to avoid explaining how it's not sovereign authority and it hasn't been delegated sovereign authority to perform quintessential government functions. As far as the United States Government was concerned, they were on notice that that's exactly what VEB was doing, and that's why Mr. Buryakov was being sent here.

THE COURT: What is the answer to the question? Is Mr. Buryakov an employee of VEB Bank and/or is he an employee of the Russian Federation?

MR. HERSHMAN: He is a representative, deputy representative, of VEB Bank. VEB Bank is encompassed in the definition of foreign government under the regulations. As such, 951(d)(2) applies directly to him.

THE COURT: I get that. I'm just asking a more simple, direct question. Is he an employee of the Russian Federation?

MR. HERSHMAN: He is an employee of VEB Bank. He is a representative official of VEB Bank. VEB Bank is encompassed in the definition of "foreign government" under the regulation. Therefore, when you look at the exemption section under 951(d), he is exempt from registering. By virtue of his position at VEB Bank --

1 THE COURT: But is there an answer to my question about whether he's an employee of --2 3 MR. HERSHMAN: He's an official --4 THE COURT: Whoa, whoa. Let me finish the question. 5 Is there an answer to the question about whether he is 6 an employee of the Russian Federation, just yes or no. There 7 may not. 8 MR. HERSHMAN: I think it begs the question, your 9 Honor, with all due respect. 10 THE COURT: I know that. I'm trying to get you not to 11 beg the question; I'm trying to get you to answer the question. 12 MR. HERSHMAN: Well, I understand. But what I'm 13 trying to do is to point your Honor to the actual words of the 14 statute which say --15 THE COURT: I get that. I got that in your papers too. I'm just trying to figure out --16 17 MR. HERSHMAN: I think that he is a 18 publicly-acknowledged foreign official, and he is not required under the terms of the definition in Section 73.1 and 951(d)(2) 19 20 to further register. He was on notice. 21 THE COURT: I get it. 22 MR. HERSHMAN: Now with respect to the bill of 23 particulars, just briefly, what Mr. Fee ignored was the 24 specific points that we raise on page 22 and 23.

THE COURT: I don't mean to cut you off, but here's

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procedurally what I'm thinking of doing: I think we should resolve the motion to dismiss first. And if you're successful, then bill of particulars is moot. If the government is successful, then it's not moot.

If it's not moot, I would prefer not to resolve it today anyway, because that's something that I think I have been hinting or saying that I expect the lawyers to do more. It's not a criticism, but I would expect the lawyers in a meet-and-confer could take a matter like those presented here further than they are in the papers. That's not a criticism.

So I wouldn't rule, even if I get to it on the bill of particulars, today.

Does that work for you?

MR. HERSHMAN: That works for me.

THE COURT: I know you both, and I think you could make more progress, if it came to that, on the bill of particulars without me intervening.

MR. HERSHMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Hold on for just a second.

(Pause)

THE COURT: So as expected and happened, both your papers, both sides, are excellent and the oral argument was very helpful, as well.

It's now 12:20. If you are available at 2 o'clock, I should be able to have my thoughts together to give you a

1 ruling at that time. Does that work for everybody? 2 And can we have the interpreter back at 2, as well? 3 Okay. Thanks. I'll see you then. 4 MR. FEE: Thank you, your Honor. 5 (Recess) 6 AFTERNOON SESSION 7 2:05 P.M. 8 THE COURT: Did we lose Mr. Fee? 9 MS. SKOTKO: Yes, your Honor. One standing. 10 THE COURT: First of all, as I said this morning, the 11 papers were terrific and so is the oral argument. I'm going to 12 rule on the first part of the motion, on the motion to dismiss, 13 and then we will see where we are with respect to the bill of 14 particulars. 15 This ruling is based on the entire record of the case, even though I may not cite to or mention other aspects of the 16 17 case. Certainly without limitation, it includes the complaint in the indictment and also the parties' briefs. I'll probably 18 mention excerpts from them, but I reviewed them in their 19 20 entirety, and the entire record, oral argument, court 21 appearances, etc., that have happened in this case are part of this ruling. 22 23 So essentially in the motion to dismiss the defense

argues that the indictment fails to state a criminal offense by

Mr. Buryakov as a matter of law in several respects. One is

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that the indictment fails to negate exceptions found in 18
United States Code, Section 951(d). In another, that
Mr. Buryakov is exempt from the statute, exempted from the
statute, as he is a foreign official. And third, in that any
ambiguity under Section 951, and also in particular the
terminology or the phrase "publicly-acknowledged and sponsored
officials" should be construed in favor of the defendant.

A second argument presented by the defense under the motion-to-dismiss rubric is that applying Section 951 to Mr. Buryakov would deprive him of fair warning under the due process clause of the Constitution. And a third branch of the motion to dismiss, related somewhat to the second, is that Section 951 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Buryakov.

So I'll take each of those in turn.

The issue of ambiguity won't be discussed immediately because it's related to two of the other sections, vagueness and due process, etc., but it will be covered.

So first as to the issue of failure to negate an exception.

Count One of the indictment alleges that Mr. Buryakov engaged in a conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent in the United States; and Count Two alleges that he acted as an unregistered agent in the United States. I'm not going to read Counts One and Two; as I said before, the entire indictment is

incorporated here by reference.

According to the defense, the indictment, as I've said, does not negate the statutory exception found at 18 U.S.C., 951(d), as it does not allege that at no time material to this indictment was Mr. Buryakov officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored official or representative of a foreign government.

The defense states that where an exception is incorporated into the enacting clause of a statute, the burden is on the prosecution to plead and to prove that the defendant is not within the exception.

The government, by contrast, argues that, quote -- I think this is a quote -- not the entire quote, but partially, that the United States Supreme Court has affirmed the settled rule that an indictment need not include allegations negating each exception or affirmative defense in a criminal statute. The government states that the indictment here plainly alleges facts sufficient to prove the elements of both charged offenses, namely, a conspiracy and an attempt to violate Section 951, which provides criminal liability for whoever acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the attorney general.

Relevant authorities here that I've looked at are Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, in part, that the indictment must be a plain, concise,

and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense or offenses charged. Also, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is relevant. It says, in part, that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation.

Generally speaking, an indictment need do little more than track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place of the alleged crime. That comes from *United States v. Stavroulakis*, a Second Circuit case from 1992 found at 952 F.2d 686.

It is also true -- and this is a quote from McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, a 1922 case which we discussed briefly this morning. This quote is found: "It has come to be a settled rule in this jurisdiction that an indictment or other pleading founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense or of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere, and that it is incumbent on one who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it.

Also 18 United States Code, 951(a) states, I mentioned this before, but it's worth saying again: Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the attorney general, if required in subsection

(b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.

And the exception, 18 United States Code, 951(d) states: For purposes of this section, the term "agent of a foreign government" means an individual who agrees to operate within the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official, except that such term does not include any officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored official or representative of a foreign government.

In the instant case, the indictment tracks the language of the statute charged and states the time and place of the alleged crimes. The government is not required, and it's too bad he's not here in this respect, Mr. Fee seemed to indicate to the Court this morning that the government could and may very well do so, that is to say, negate the exception, the applicable exceptions in Section 951 of the indictment.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss on this ground is respectfully denied.

Now, turning to the 1b exemption. 78 CFR Part 73 defines "officially and publicly-acknowledged and sponsored" as meaning that the person described therein has filed with the Secretary of State a fully-executed notification of status with a foreign government or is a visitor officially sponsored by a foreign government whose status is known and whose visit is authorized by an agency of the United States Government.

The term "agent" is defined as follows in 78 CFR Part 73: Individuals acting as representatives of or on behalf of a foreign government or official who are subject to the direction or control of that foreign government or official.

According to the defense, the indictment alleges that Mr. Buryakov was an employee of a Russian bank, VEB, a Russian state-owned agency.

Quote from the defense: "It is a matter of public record that Mr. Buryakov was present in the United States with notice to and authorization by the U.S. Government, which granted him a visa to work as an official at a Russian state-owned agency."

Defense also argues that: "On the face of the indictment, which relates only to registration, Mr. Buryakov was a foreign government official, falling squarely into an exception to registration under Section 951 with respect to officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored officials or representatives of a foreign government."

The government counters the following. The government says, and this is a quote: "The fact that Buryakov obtained a work visa to enter the United States as an international banker employed by a New York bank by lying to the United States on his visa application about his intention not to engage in espionage neither conferred upon Buryakov some initial status or immunity nor shielded him from liability under Section 951."

Additionally, the government states that VEB, that's the bank's assets "are drawn from the reorganization of its predecessor institution, asset contributions of the Russian Federation, income from VEB's activities, voluntary asset contributions and donations, as well as other lawful sources."

"As such," this is a continuation of the government's quote, "VEB is only partially funded by the Russian Federation."

The government also argues that "the fact that VEB appears to be at least partly funded by the Russian Federation and claims to conduct banking activities on behalf of the Russian Federation does not make every employee of the New York bank an official representative of the Russian Federation."

According to Defense Exhibit B, which is an English version of the Russian law, appears to be establishing VEB, these points are true. VEB is a state corporation established by the Russian Federation. That's in Article 2, Section 1.

The assets of VEB shall be formed with the assets obtained as a result of the reorganization of the bank for foreign economic affairs of the U.S.S.R., the asset contribution of the Russian Federation, income from VEB's activities, voluntary asset contributions and donations, and from other lawful sources. That's in Article 5, Section 1.

VEB shall not be liable for the obligations of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation shall not be held

liable for the obligations of VEB. Article 5, Section 2.

The government of the Russian Federation shall, one, appoint and dismiss members of the supervisory board of VEB.

That's found in Article 6, Section 2.

This is not the entirety of these articles in these sections; these are selected sections by me.

Members of the supervisory board of VEB shall be appointed by the government of the Russian Federation for a five-year term. Article 9, Section 4.

It is prohibited to delegate the powers of the supervisory board of VEB to the management board of VEB or to the chairman of VEB. Article 12, Section 2.

The chairman of VEB is appointed and dismissed by the president of the Russian Federation. Article 15, Section 2.

The chairman of VEB is a sole executive body of VEB, and he or she shall direct its ongoing activities. Article 15, Section 1.

The Court finds that the defendant, Mr. Buryakov, does not qualify for the exemption in 951 and, relatedly, that VEB does not qualify as a foreign government. Although the Russian law establishing VEB states that VEB is a state corporation, it is clear from the very same Russian law that VEB was funded in part through other nongovernmental sources, and that neither the Russian Federation nor VEB is liable for one another's legal obligations, notwithstanding the defense contention that

the bank is owned by the state, that is to say, by Russia.

Counsel for the defense has also argued to this Court that "VEB is a freestanding company under Russian law; it is not an arm or agency of the Russian government, but has a separate and independent corporate existence that is well-recognized under U.S. law." That was contained in a defense letter to the Court dated May 14, 2015 at page 2.

Defense counsel has also stated that "The underlying offense in this case has nothing to do with VEB's relationship with the Russian government." Same letter, same page.

Defense has also said that the Russian state is not paying — this was in the context of a *Curcio* hearing and the retainer agreement for White & Case. The Russian state is not paying for Mr. Buryakov's defense any more than the U.S. Government could be said to be paying for every corporate action taken by the Export-Import Bank of the United States or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, both companies the shares of which are owned by the United States.

Also, in connection with the resolution of third-party payor for defense counsel, there's a letter dated 5/10/2015 where the defense says: No conflict is created simply because a third party is paying Mr. Buryakov's legal fees. In particular, we can confirm to the Court that the third party here is not involved in this case and is not related to any codefendant.

On 4/17/2015, the retainer agreement between VEB and White & Case was presented and refers to Mr. Buryakov as "bank's employee" at page 6.

In court on May 18, 2015, defense counsel stated: "I don't believe that because VEB is paying the legal fees of an employee of the bank that raises any issues any different from any other criminal case where an employee of an institution is charged and the employer agrees to pay the legal fees of that employee."

In the same transcript, defense counsel refers the Court to the agreement between VEB and White & Case in which Mr. Buryakov is referred to, again, as the bank's employee. In the same transcript, defense counsel states: "This is no different from any other corporate entity providing counsel for an employee in view of the corporation and White & Case." And on June 1st, 2015, the transcript contains a confirmation that Mr. Buryakov's employer, VEB, was paying the legal fees.

Even assuming arguendo that VEB were to qualify as a foreign government, which I have determined it emphatically does not, defendant would nevertheless still not qualify as being officially sponsored by a foreign government whose visit was authorized by an agency of the United States Government, as his status as an agent of a foreign government was not known to the United States, only his status as a VEB Bank employee was known.

It is alleged that defendant was working as a covert intelligence agent for the Russian Federation, not in a position of a deputy representative of VEB for which he received his visa. And at no point did Mr. Buryakov notify the United States Government or any agency thereof that he was an intelligence agent for the Russian Federation.

Moreover, Mr. Buryakov's position as a deputy representative of VEB may very well not qualify as an official or representative of a foreign government, as that position is not one which is subject to the direction or control of the Russian Federation. Under the Russian law establishing VEB, only the chairman and the members of the supervisory board of VEB are hired by either the president of the Russian Federation or the government of the Russian Federation. Mr. Buryakov was neither of those.

Further, there does not appear to the Court to be any basis to extend the definition of foreign official to include a wide group of employees, as suggested by the defense, or to employ the definition that may be found in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

With respect to vagueness, as I said before, I'm going to get to that in a moment.

The motion to dismiss on the 951 grounds is denied.

Due process grounds as a basis for dismissal.

According to the defense, the indictment represents a

clear break with the U.S. Government's prior use of Section 951, namely, the first time the statute ever in its current form has been applied to a foreign government representative openly working as such in the United States.

This is a quote from the defense:

"Indeed, since the Section 951(d)(2) exemption was added, no reported case has been brought against a foreign government official who has held himself out as such. Instead, prior indictments have charged privately-employed individuals surreptitiously working for foreign governments."

A quote from the defense: "The glaring absence of any precedence for the theory of prosecution here shows the fair notice problem."

The government's response, in summary, is this:

As charged in the indictment, Buryakov was acting as a covert Russian spy embedded at a bank in Manhattan, a bank that by Buryakov's own account, is not an arm or agency of the Russian government, but has a separate and independent corporate existence that is well-recognized under U.S. law. That's citing, again, the letter that I cited a few minutes ago dated May 14, 2005 from the defense.

Throughout the period of the charged offenses,

Mr. Buryakov was reporting on his intelligence-gathering
activities not to his superiors in the New York bank, but to a
team of Russian spies -- this all comes from the government's

submission -- but to a team of Russian spies operating in the United States under the cover of their consular posts.

Mr. Buryakov regularly passed the intelligence he gathered to other spies during covert meetings with his co-conspirators at locations outside the New York bank.

In addition, Mr. Buryakov and his co-conspirators routinely met and discussed the efforts to collect and to take information from unsuspecting sources of intelligence in the United States.

Among other things — this is all from the government's submission — Mr. Buryakov's co-conspirators specifically discussed Buryakov's past efforts to hide his true job, being a spy for the Russian Federation, from some of his supervisors at a branch of VEB outside of Russia and the United States.

Given the substance and nature of these allegations, according to the government, Buryakov cannot credibly claim that he was unaware that he might be held criminally responsible for his misconduct.

In determining whether or not a statute satisfies the fair notice prong — this is a quote from a Second Circuit decision — we ask whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear that at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. The cite is U.S. v. Rosen, 716 F.3d, 691, which is a Second Circuit case

from 2013.

The motion to dismiss on due process grounds is, therefore, respectfully denied.

The statute provided clear notice to the defendant of what conduct was prohibited, and the indictment clearly sets forth that the defendant violated that statute.

Another cite is *U.S. v. Lindauer*, 2004 Westlaw 2813168, a Southern District case from 2004.

And the last branch of the motion to dismiss has to do with vagueness. It is related, as I said, to the due process branch, but it's briefed separately.

Defense counsel argues that applying Section 951 to Mr. Buryakov would render the law unconstitutionally vague as applied because there would be no meaningful standards to guide application of Section 951 to other foreign officials like Mr. Buryakov. Additionally, the defense states that to the extent the term "publicly-acknowledged and sponsored official" is ambiguous, that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity here, where there is connection between the first branch of the motion and the vagueness issue.

Defense counsel argues further that "There are potentially thousands of individuals in the United States like Mr. Buryakov. Persons openly working in representative capacities for foreign government agencies and instrumentalities, but in nonconsular, nondiplomatic posts,

these persons all would be agents of a foreign government under 951(a). And if Section 951(d)(2) does not provide them with a safe harbor, they would be vulnerable to prosecution for failing to register. The government could pick and choose whom to address and prosecute based on arbitrary criteria such as nationality or country of origin.

And finally from that quote from the defense: "Such uncabined discretion is one of the dangers that the vagueness doctrine prevents." Defense motion at page 19.

The government responds that "Buryakov cannot demonstrate that Section 951 is vague as applied to him. Section 951 and related statutes and regulations outline in detail the conduct sought to be proscribed." That's the government response at page 20.

The government also states that "In this case the conduct charged in the indictment is clearly proscribed by the statute. The indictment alleges that Buryakov knowingly acted in the United States as an agent of the Russian Federation, and specifically at the direction of foreign officials in the United States who were Russian intelligence agents, and that he conspired to do the same.

"The indictment and the underlying complaint outline in detail the actions Buryakov took on behalf of the Russian Federation, all while ostensibly working as a banker in New York for the New York bank." Government response at page 21.

"The void for vagueness doctrine that we are here considering derives from the constitutional guarantee of due process, hence related to the section immediately before this one, which requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." The source of that remark is *Mannix v. Phillips*, 619 F.3d 187, a Second Circuit case from 2010.

"Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine, the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to government law enforcement." The cite is Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, a 1983 Supreme Court case.

The statute here is not vague as applied to Mr. Buryakov; it clearly defines what conduct is prohibited, and the indictment clearly sets forth that the defendant violated this statute. As I started the proceeding this morning saying there is no finding that that is so, the defendant remains subject and able to enjoy the presumption of innocence unless and until a jury determines that he was quilty.

Defense acknowledges that the void for vagueness

challenge to 951 has been rejected by several federal courts, although not necessarily in exactly the same context as is presented here. They do that at defense motion page 19 and footnote 12. The cite is *United States v. Duran*, 596 F.3d 1282, it's an Eleventh Circuit case from 2010, where this quote is found: "Section 951 plainly and concretely identifies the conduct which constitutes its violation, and the statute language is clear and unambiguous." *See also United States v. Truong*, 629 F.2d 908, a Fourth Circuit case from 1980. And also I refer you to *United States v. Lindauer* again, the 2004 case at Westlaw 2813168 from the Southern District, 2004.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss on grounds of vagueness is also denied, respectfully.

So that leave us then with the motion for a bill of particulars.

As I mentioned this morning, it is not my intention to resolve that aspect of the motion at this time, and perhaps I won't need to, because I am directing the parties to meet and confer and see if they cannot resolve all of the issues which are presented in defendant's motion.

Hold on for one second.

(Pause)

THE COURT: So here's what I'm going to do: I'm going to schedule a further conference for September 2 at 2 p.m. And that essentially would presume that you're able to meet and

confer to continue the progress of the case until then. If 1 there were some problem that came up in the meantime that 2 3 required court attention, you'll let me know by correspondence, 4 I'm sure. 5 MR. HERSHMAN: Your Honor, September 2nd is for what 6 purpose? 7 THE COURT: Status conference. Just to see --8 September 2nd. 9 MR. HERSHMAN: I think that's a little long for us, if 10 we are not able to get access to the material. 11 THE COURT: What I'm trying to say is that in setting 12 that date aside assumes that you are able to work things out. 13 In the event that you aren't, then I probably will hear from 14 you by correspondence and we'll see what I can do for you 15 sooner than that. 16 MR. HERSHMAN: We are interested in setting a trial 17 date. 18 THE COURT: I can do that right now. 19 MR. HERSHMAN: Okay. 20 THE COURT: When do you want to go to trial? 21 MR. HERSHMAN: Sometime in November or December. 22 MS. SKOTKO: Your Honor, sorry. 23 Could we have a moment to just confer? 24 (Pause) 25 MR. HERSHMAN: One second, your Honor.

(Pause)

MR. HERSHMAN: So, your Honor, I think, having had the opportunity to confer with the government, what we would suggest is an earlier conference date, status conference date, maybe two weeks from now, during which interim point we will discuss the various issues that we need to discuss, which include the meet-and-confer on the discovery, but also any potential issues that may arise here and other issues relating to classified material.

THE COURT: No, I still prefer to keep the schedule that I set, which is September 2, because I think that the defendant has a right to the government's assistance with respect to the discovery. I think if you talk together in good faith, you will resolve virtually all of those issues.

So it's only in the event that you can't that we may have to go to plan B. But, for now, I'm going to have the status conference on September 2 at 2 p.m.; the trial is on December 7, 2015, at 9 a.m. There will be a final pretrial conference on December 1, 2015, at noon.

And here is the pretrial submission schedule:

First of all, the documents I'm about to describe will be due on November 6, and they are as follows: First, joint jury instructions. And I want to come back to that and talk about how we do that. The joint verdict sheet, a one-sentence statement of the case and a one-sentence statement of the

defense. That's for purposes of the voir dire.

Hypothetically, you could say, The government contends AB, and the defendant responds. A list of names and places that may come up in the trial also for purposes of the voir dire. And motions in limine.

So each side, one motion, although it obviously may have different branches to it, but one document which contains whatever you have to assert by way of motion *in limine*. And those are, both for the government and the defense, due on November 6.

And on November 13, any responses to motions in limine that may have been served.

Now, back to the joint jury instructions.

So in a criminal case I ask the government to do the first draft of the jury instructions at least two weeks before they're due. On November 6 they should be presented to the defense. The defense has the opportunity then to review the instructions, to accept or adopt any instructions that it's comfortable with. As to any instruction that it has an objection to, on the same disk, or however it's presented to you, to note briefly your legal objection, and then the instruction that you would prefer to have in place of the government's instructions. So there I have it in one document, both sides' position.

Christine will give you a sample set of jury

instructions. I would ask the government and the defense to use as many of the so-called boilerplate instructions as I typically do use, and for all of you then to focus your attention on the substantive charges that relate to this case.

And the same is true of the joint verdict sheet. The government does the first draft, gives that to the defense, and the defense would either say yes or no or what they would say differently. And that also would be presented with the defense package as a joint enterprise with the government on November 6.

So I think that's about as quick as I can give you, but I think you probably need that time to get ready for trial.

I'm happy to accommodate you on December 7.

Just as a heads up, I think the end of the month I'm going to be away between Christmas Day and January 1st.

Perhaps we wouldn't have trial then anyway, if the trial was still ongoing. But just so you know for scheduling purposes, I'm planning to be away for that — it's a little less than a week, I think.

So anybody have any questions? No?

MS. SKOTKO: Yes, your Honor, just to flag this for your Honor's attention.

We are still in the process of determining whether there will be any motions pursuant to the Classified

Information Procedure Act. If we anticipate that there might

be something under Section 4 or any other sections, I would suggest that perhaps we could write to the Court and defense counsel and propose a schedule for the filing of those motions.

THE COURT: So it's always best if you could meet and confer, and jointly then you could send me a letter and say this is what you propose, and they either agree or disagree.

It could all be contained in the same letter. You could represent them or they could represent you. Probably it's something you might do.

MS. SKOTKO: Yes, your Honor.

And just to clarify, pursuant to the schedule, there are no further motion practice --

THE COURT: That's it.

So if I don't hear anything from you, I'll see you on September 2nd. If I do, then we'll go to plan B, which is yet to be devised.

All right. Great. Nice to see you.

Thanks very much.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Please be seated, everybody.

I forgot to ask at the close of the earlier proceeding two minutes or so ago whether there was a speedy trial issue or application that would take us to December 7, 2015, which is the trial date.

MS. SKOTKO: Yes, your Honor.

I apologize, that was my omission.

The government would respectfully request that time be excluded through December 7th, which is the commencement of the trial, to give the parties an opportunity to -- specifically for the defense to review discovery and to prepare for trial.

THE COURT: I'm going to find under 18 United States Code, Section 3161, that the request for adjournment is appropriate and warrants exclusion of the adjourned time from speedy trial calculations.

I further find that the exclusion is designed to prevent any possible miscarriage of justice, to facilitate these proceedings, including preparation for trial, and to guarantee effective representation of and preparation by counsel for both parties. Thus, the need for exclusion and the ends of justice outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, pursuant to 18 U.S.C., Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B).

And just to reiterate -- I think we made the point before -- between now and the trial date, apart from what is scheduled to be filed, if anybody is entertaining some other form of filing, that would have to be preceded by a letter to the Court explaining what that is, and then we'll take the next step. Okay?

Great. Thanks very much.

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